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Abstract. It has been observed that similar prints can obtain quite different prices at different 
auctions within the same auction period. Previous works applying hedonic price technique to 
determine the formation of auction prices of objects of art have found no conclusive result about 
the impact of auction houses on final prices. In these studies the object of art has been the unit, 
and influence of auction houses is analysed by testing whether auction house impact on price is 
significant or not within a framework of central tendencies. In order to focus on auction houses 
as a unit we have applied a benchmarking technique, DEA, developed for efficiency studies. 
Performance indexes are defined and calculated giving an insight into auction house differences 
difficult to obtain using hedonic price approach. 
 
Key words: Performance, auction house, Picasso prints, hedonic price, benchmarking, 
best practice, DEA. 
 
JEL classification: C61, D24, Z11.  
                                                            
* A first version of the paper was written while the first author was a visiting fellow at the International 
Centre for Economic Research (ICER), Turin, Fall 2001- Spring 2002. It is part of the project “Cheaper 
and better?” at the Frisch Centre, financed by the Norwegian Research Council, and of the project on 
“Cultural goods” financed by the Italian Research Council. We are indebted to Dag Fjeld Edvardsen for 
help with preparing calculations and figures. The authors are also grateful to the participants of the XII 







1. Introduction  
 
An impression from the edition of 250 of the Picasso’ first published print, Le Repas 
Frugal, was sold for 374,000 US dollars at Christie’s New York in November, 1990. Two 
weeks later an impression of this print was sold at Christie’s London for 189,980 US 
dollars. Hence, an intriguing question arises about whether there is a relationship between 
the price and the auction house where the work of art is sold. 
 
There is some evidence on influence of auction houses in the literature. Pesando (1993), 
using information on repeat sales of identical prints, shows that there is a tendency for 
prices paid by buyers to be systematically higher at certain auction houses. In particular, 
prints sold at Sotheby’s in New York perform average prices 14 per cent higher than the 
prices of identical prints sold at Christie’s in New York for the period 1985-1992.  
 
The only approach that has been developed so far to address this issue is the hedonic price 
technique. The  hedonic price technique has been used extensively to investigate the 
investment value of visual art collectibles, such as paintings  (Anderson (1974), Frey and 
Pommerehene (1989), Buelens and Ginsburgh (1993), Chanel et al. (1996), Agnello and 
Pierce (1999), Renneboog and Van Houtte (2002), Picci and Scorcu, 2002), prints 
(Pesando (1993) and Pesando and Shum, 1999), and sculptures (Locatelli-Biey and 
Zanola, 2002). 
 
In the hedonic price model the influence on the auction price of single art objects of 
various variables is found by regressing the auction price on this set of variables regarded 
as determinants of price. The variables are both categorical variables, like reputation of 
artist, condition of object, style, provenance and exhibitions, authenticity (signed or not), 
medium, and continuous variables, like size measured in various ways. The auction house 
handling the art object is one of the categorical variables that have been used when trying 
to determine their influence (Czujack, 1997). The partial impact on price of each variable 
including characteristics or attributes are then associated with parameters of the estimated 




However, the  hedonic technique only represents an  indirect approach to analyse the 
eventual existence of a relationship between price and auction house since it does not 
focus on the latter as unit of observation, but on the individual art object. An alternative 
way of addressing the performance of auction houses is to cast the auction house activity 
in a production setting: art objects of various characteristics are received as inputs and the 
auction prices obtained are then the outputs
1. For a given set of art objects an auction 
house is performing better the higher the auction price is. In order to compare an auction 
house with the best performing ones and to estimate how much better results an auction 
house could have if it is as good as the best, a benchmark in the form of a best practice 
production function can be established
2. One could argue that it is the general demand for 
the type of art object under investigation that determines the price and not the auction 
house. But data shows that even for the same year prices for similar art objects differ 
between auction houses, and concerning development over time one could claim that an 
auction house should advice a client as to when the client should sell or buy. The auction 
houses compete for customers. Art objects are not perishable goods! Predicting booms 
and through years may be considered as a part of being efficient
3.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to systematically investigate auction house performance, what 
Pesando calls “noise”. We analyse one segment of the art market: the market for Picasso 
prints as drawn from auctions held during the period of sale 1988-1995 as registered in the 
1995 edition of the Mayer International Auction Records on CD-ROM. We adapt a non-
parametric model for calculating efficiency scores known in literature as the DEA model 
(see e.g. Coelli et al. (1999) for an introduction).  The DEA model uses linear 
programming techniques to construct a non-parametric piecewise linear frontier. The 
frontier envelops all the observations as tight as possible, subject to some basic 
assumptions on the production technology. This approach provides insights into the 
performance differences hidden behind average price figures.  
 
                                                            
1 Notice that we do not model the service production proper of auction houses. For such an exercise the 
internal inputs such as labour of different skills, offices, etc., should be regarded, and some volume 
description of auctions formulated as outputs, e.g. number of art objects sold of various types, and also 
considering services such as evaluation and authentication.   
2 An alternative could be to focus on the difference between pre-auction estimates and realised prices as a 
source of inefficiency. However, pre-auction estimates are not readily available to us. 




In so doing, however, we have to deal with the fact that the number of auction houses is 
quite lower than the number of art objects. This may lead to a potential problem of 
degrees of freedom. This implies that one may be forced to reduce the number of 
variables which are suggested to influence the sales price of items. Even if such omissions 
seem to waste information compared to the hedonic modeling method, the purpose here is 
to give a type of insight into auction house performances that the hedonic pricing method 
cannot accommodate. Furthermore, we only focus on Picasso prints which tend to be of 
similar quality and condition (Pesando, 1996), so that number of quality variables can be 
kept low. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we present the non-parametric 
benchmark model (DEA) used  in this paper, and introduce some new measures of 
performance, building on outputs from efficiency- and productivity models. Data and 
choice of variables are described in Section 3. The results from applying the described 
methodology are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. The methodological approach  
 
The basis for measuring performance of an auction house is to adapt a non-parametric 
model for calculating efficiency scores termed the DEA model. We will then cast the 
auction house activity in a production setting with sales of prints made by different 
techniques as outputs and the dimensional description and type of technique as inputs. 
The unit is an auction house observed for a sales period, i.e. an auction house is formally 
split into units for each period for which the house has sales. The “technology” of 
converting prints with physical descriptions into sales values is expressed by the 
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where x is the input vector and y is the output vector. In the last expression defining the 
envelopment of data points, the J observations, indexed  j, are introduced with an index m 
for type of output and index n for type of input. The variables lj are non-negative weights 
or intensity variables defining points on the production surface. Constant returns to scale 
is assumed. Basic properties are that the production set is convex, includes all observed 
points and envelopment is done with minimum extrapolation, i.e. the fit is as “tight” as 
possible. 
 
We see from the definition of production possibilities (1) that an observation (auction 
house activity for a specific period) may produce less than the maximal possibilities, and 
may employ more inputs than necessary. Shortfall of outputs or excess of inputs is defined 
as inefficiency in economics. A scalar measure of inefficiency, fi, based on shortfall of 











Each type of output is scaled up with the same factor, fi, until the production function is 
reached. The scalar, fi, must be greater or equal to one.  If the value one is obtained, then 
the observation in question is on the production surface. The observation will then be 
defined as best practice. 
 
In hedonic regression models for art object prices the set of explanatory variables usually 
include categorical ones. The categorical information is handled by using dummy 
variables (i.e. 0 if the unit does not have the characteristic in question, 1 otherwise), and 
                                                            
4 In efficiency analyses the measure 1/fi is called the output oriented Farrell (1957) measure of technical 
efficiency. 
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the partial impact on the dependent variable of each characteristic may be identified 
(relative to a reference type or group). The analogy with our production formulation is 
that the dependent variable is a single output, and that the explanatory variables are the 
inputs. 
 
In the DEA model a general way of  handling categorical variables, parallel to the 
treatment of dummy variables in hedonic price regressions, is to interpret them as 
different types of inputs and/or outputs. Let zkj be a categorical characteristic k (k=1,..,K) 
of unit j (j=1,..,J) regarding types of inputs, and let xnj be continuous input variables of 
type n (n=1,..,N). We then have K·N different types of inputs; each continuous variable is 
assigned to each of the K types of inputs. Each unit may employ fewer characteristics than 
the total n umber available, resulting in a value of zero for the non-observed types of 
inputs. Treatment of categorical output characteristics is analogous. Following this 
approach when defining variables the standard DEA model (2) can be used
5. 
 
The outputs and inputs must now be distinguished according to auction house, a, type of 




ma x y , for the output- and input 
vectors of a unit. Thus each unit is identified by a˛A and t˛T, where A and T are the set 
of auction houses and sales periods respectively. The mark-up variable is written in (2) as  
fi . It is now changed to  t
o f  when solving for the unit from auction house o˛A at period t, 
and both the auction house index a and time period index t are running when defining the 
benchmark in (2).  
 
We need both contemporaneous and inter-temporal performance indexes. For the former, 
the score calculated by solving the programming model (2) is used directly with a 
modification for periods without best practice units. Let us introduce 
t J  as the set of 
auction houses with positive activity in period  t. The  Contemporaneous Performance 
Index,  at p , for auction house a in period t, is defined as follows: 
                                                            
5 In the DEA literature a hierarchical structure has been imposed on models with categorical variables, see 
Banker and Morey (1986), and further developments in Kamakura (1988) and Charnes et al. (1994). See 
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p                                                                                    (3) 
 
The Contemporaneous Performance Index shows the performance of an auction house 
relative to the best performance that period. The index has to be greater or equal to one. A 
number for the index, say 1.05, means that the auction house in question could have had 




It may also be of interest  to characterise the performance of an auction house for a 
specific period against a standard for all periods together. A possibility is to have a fixed 
basis for comparison. A natural base is the geometric mean,  f , of all 
scores, ) , ( T t A a
t
a ˛ ˛ f  calculated by solving (2). A bilateral Inter-temporal Performance 
Index may then be defined as:
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p                                                                                                   (4) 
 
The index shows the auction house performance against the inter-temporal total mean. 
The values may be both greater and smaller than one. A number, say 1.05, is  now  
showing  that the auction house a for period t has 5% higher sales value than the mean 
performance, while a number 0.95 shows that the auction house has a sales value of 5% 
less than the mean performance. 
 
An overall ranking of the performance of the auction houses may be obtained by taking 
averages of the contemporaneous indices in (3). However, since  the base varies this 
procedure is not recommendable. A better alternative is to use (4) and compare the 
geometric means of each auction  house  with  the total geometric mean, the auction house  
 
                                                            
6 In the efficiency and productivity literature this index is called the output oriented bilateral Malmquist 
productivity index between auction house, a, and the most productive auction house for the period in 
question, see Caves et al. (1982). 




Overall Performance Index: 
A a
a
a ˛ = ,
f
f
p                                                                                                               (5) 
 
The indices (3) – (5) all show performance based on all types of outputs. Since auction 
houses will have a different mix of types of prints both relative to each other and over 
time, we should also develop a type of index that enables us to study performance for each 
type of output. Keeping the perspective of all time periods, we can develop an inter-
temporal performance index measuring the actual sales as compared to the potential sales 
the auction house could have done in each period if it has been as efficient as the best 
performer. This index is then specific for each type of output. We construct hypothetical 
sales values for under-performing units by employing the mark-up scores from the 
solution of programme (2). For each type of print we can compare the sales performance 
over all the auction periods for each auction house by forming the ratio of actual sales 
values over calculated efficient sales values. An Overall Output-specific Performance 
Index, PIma is defined as: 
  




This index may also be aggregated over type of output to yield a ranking of auction 
houses similar to (5).
8 However, since the purpose of the index is to reveal differences as 





                                                            
8 The difference between these two indices will then be that (6) uses the share of total sales in one period 
relative to the total for all periods as weight for the mark-up factors, while in (5) the geometric means of the 
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3. Data and choice of model 
 
3.1 Data 
The definition of an auction house in the study is the local branches of the two big auction 
houses Sotheby’s and Christie’s, and aggregates of national auction houses for France, 
Germany and Switzerland, and then other EU countries, other US houses and other houses 
in the rest of the world.  
 
The data are compiled from biannual auctions held during the sale period 1988-1995 as 
reported in the 1995 edition of the Mayer International Auction Records on CD-ROM. 
Prices are gross of the buyers’ and sellers’ transaction fees paid to auction houses. No 
information is provided on the origin of the prints. In order to reduce the possibility of 
heterogeneous items, in this study we only include editions of 50 total printed issues.
9 All 
prints are priced in U.S. dollars deflated by using the U.S. consumer price index (end of 
1990 = 100) to  remove the general trend of inflation. For the sake of simplicity, we 
assume that all sales occur at the end of each half- year period. 
 
3.2 Choice of model 
The purpose of this study is to analyse the performances of auction houses by studying the 
performance of “transforming” an art object with physical characteristics and attributes 
into auction prices. However, since we have only 10 units of analysis, in order to achieve 
results of interest we assume that the same frontier technology is valid for all periods. 
This can be defended because technological change is not so relevant for the special type 
of production process we are dealing with. We are therefore assuming an inter-temporal 
frontier according to the terminology of Tulkens and van den Eeckaut (1995). As the unit 
of analysis we will then use an auction house observed for a specific sales period. We 
have 16 sales periods and 10 auction houses, so this gives us 160 units of analysis as a 
                                                            




maximum if all houses have sales in each sale period.
10 There are periods when some 
auction houses do not have sales leaving us with 125 units in the analysis.  
 
It could be argued that the assumption of no technical change could be invalid if there is 
systematic movements over time, i.e. price increases constituting technical progress and 
price declines regress. On an average level we definitely have systematic price trends, as 
shown in Pesando (1993) and Pesando and Shum (1999). However, firstly, we are 
focussing on development of  best practice prices, so use of total averages may not be 
relevant. Secondly, we are directly interested in identifying if some periods dominate the 
performance measures we have set up. The ability to predict and give customers quality 
advice is part of our performance concept. 
 
The number of units created in such a way gives us some scope for introducing variables 
of interest. The surface is used as a factor  affecting the final price of Picasso prints.
11 The 
rationale is that the higher the total square centimetres the higher the auction price is.
12 
The print techniques are also suggested in the literature to influence the print quality and 
hence affecting the final price. There may be distinct markets for different techniques. 
Five different techniques are considered: etching, litho, drypoint, aquatint, and linocut.
13 
 
The aggregated auction sales within each group of prints are used as outputs. Restricting 
ourselves to five techniques will yield to five different types of outputs. These represent 
the categorical variables. For each type we have the surface yielding five continuous input 
variables, leaving us with five input variables and ten variables in total. The surface 




                                                            
10 In the first application of the model based on Picasso oil paintings the total number of auction houses 
was only five (Førsund and Zanola, 2002). 
11 Additional factors, which are suggested to affect cost (Locatelli and Zanola, 2002), such as signature, 
production period, Zervos catalogue raisonné number, exhibition, resells, and provenance, have not been 
considered in this study due to data and dimensionality problems. Hence,  a word of caution for the 
interpretation of the DEA results.  
12 This effect is obvious and significant for paintings, but may be not of equally importance for prints. 




Table 1. Descriptive statistics of 905 Picasso prints in editions of 50  
traded during 1988-1995 (1990 US dollars) 
Technique  Variable  No. Obs.  Mean  St. Dev.  Min  Max 
  Inputs           
Etching  surface  243  1297  2061  44  31520 
Litho  surface  302  2863  1019  416  9506 
Drypoint  surface  35  1411  834  122  3425 
Aquatint  surface  86  1674  1151  51  4112 
Linocut  surface  233  2968  1109  364  4882 
  Outputs           
Etching  sale values  243  4894  5722  884  75456 
Litho  sale values  302  18980  24703  1054  214231 
Drypoint  sale values  35  6438  11414  560  69228 
Aquatint  sale values  86  13355  23187  1533  147114 
Linocut  sale values  233  35555  49417  2830  311535 
 
 
Table 1 lists the variables and the summary statistics for the individual prints involved.
14 
The highest number sold is of lithographs, while drypoint and aquatint are sold in 
markedly fewer numbers than the other techniques. On average linocut displays the 
highest sales value per print, while the other print techniques have considerably less sales 
values, especially drypoint and etching. The maximum sales values also roughly follow 
this pattern, and also the mean areas of the prints. Etching displays both the minimum and 
maximum surface values. 
 
 
4. Results  
 
The key variables generating performance results are the scores, 
t
a f , computed by solving 
(2) for each auction house in each sales period. The model, comprising five input- and 
output variables is solved using the FrischDEA software package
15.  Since the scores are 
computed within a linear programming model the presentation of statistical measure of 
reliability of results is not so straightforward. What is usually done in studies using this 




                                                            
14 Statistics on auction house sales of different types of prints are shown in Appendix. 




4.1 The contemporaneous performance index 
The Contemporaneous Performance Index,  at p , defined in (3), is set out in Table 2. Of 
the 125 units (auction house with a positive sale in a sales period), 25 show maximal 
performance, i.e. they are best practice units. It is remarkable that all auction houses have 
at least one best practice event with the exception of the house “Other US”.  
 
The interpretation  of the index numbers in each row is that the best practice performers 
have the value 1, while under-performers have values greater than 1. In the first row of 
Table 2 we see that Sotheby’s New York is the best performer in 1988:I, while the 
number 1.71 for Sotheby’s London means that this unit could have had sales 71% higher 
if it had obtained relatively the same auction results for its prints as Sotheby’s New York 
did. The results for both units are measured as how the inputs - print surface for each 
technique - is transformed into outputs - sales values for each type of print technique - 
compared with the overall best transformation in an inter-temporal setting. The latter 
comparison is expressed by a common mark-up factor for all outputs. The house “France” 
is doing very badly in the first period, its sales could have been increased with 485%. 
“World” is also under- performing, while “Switzerland”, Christie’s New Y ork and 
Christie’s London are close to the performance of Sotheby’s New York. 
 
 
Table 2. The Contemporaneous performance Index 























1988:I    1.00  1.71  1.03  1.15  5.85  1.01  -  -  -  2.69 
1988:II  1.20  4.16  1.00  1.00  -  -  4.90  -  -  - 
1989:I  1.32  2.96  3.31  1.00  1.00  4.63  2.34  1.54  -  2.98 
1989:II  1.26  1.00  1.18  1.24  1.00  1.00  4.74  1.00  -  1.00 
1990:I  2.41  1.00  2.59  1.00  3.09  1.00  1.00  1.41  4.34  1.00 
1990:II  1.54  4.18  1.81  1.00  3.13  2.14  1.00  2.14  3.91  1.86 
1991:I  2.98  5.69  1.00  2.66  4.30  1.16  1.00  -  8.24  1.00 
1991:II  3.31  1.37  1.00  8.12  20.31  4.22  4.75  -  11.83  - 
1992:I  2.49  -  3.94  -  -  2.48  1.22  -  5.89  1.00 
1992:II  1.58  1.00  4.93  1.52  10.79  -  -  -  3.91  1.92 
1993:I  2.92  1.82  4.01  -  5.25  1.00  2.61  1.65  6.09  4.37 
1993:II  1.00  3.03  6.97  1.96  1.00  -  1.54  2.68  -  - 
1994:I  3.40  3.14  3.74  -  1.00  2.14  6.32  13.69  3.59  8.81 
1994:II  5.95  1.00  1.09  3.41  -  4.71  6.49  -  5.67  - 
1995:I  2.88  3.09  3.21  1.00  4.41  -  3.82  2.74  1.79  - 






If the auction markets function efficiently (and provided we have not lost some significant 
quality differences between the prints) the contemporaneous index values should all be 
close to 1. Let us look for periods with smaller differences and periods with larger 
differences. The seven houses with sales in 1988:I are in two groups as already 
commented upon, while in 1988:II the six houses selling also divide in two with two best 
practice units. In 1989:I all but one house is selling, and the differences are becoming 
smaller. In 1989:II there are five of the nine houses selling as best practice, and it is only 
one house, “Germany”, that lags behind and should have increased sales with 374 %. The 
next period, 1990:I, shows greater differences, but still five of the 10 houses are best 
practice. Differences increase the next two periods, and 1991:II exhibits the maximal 
under-performance of the whole data set. “France” should have increased sales with 
1931%. Such an almost catastrophic number for sellers should be investigated closer by 
inspecting the individual print sales. But also “Other EU” under-performs to the tune of 
1083%, and Christie’ London with 712%. In 1992:I only six houses have sales, and four 
of them perform badly compared to best practice “World” and “Germany”. In 1992:II  
“France” is again under performing and should have increased with 979%, while the other 
houses are more even. The same pattern is repeated in the next period, while 1993:II has 
two best practice units and Christie’s New York showing its worst result with 597%. 
Differences increase in the next two periods, with Sotheby’s New York having its worst 
result with a mark-up of 495% in 1994:II. In 1995:I there is a more even performance but 
far behind the only best practice performer, Christie’s London. The Pattern is repeated in 
the last period, where only five houses participate. 
 
The market for Picasso prints have had boom years and periods of sharp falls.
16  The 
impression is that the most equal performance is seen in the boom years around 1990, or 
1990:I and 1990:II. When the bubble bursts the performance start to diverge quite 
markedly. Although the Picasso print market levels out, measured by average price for 
repeat sales, from 1993, the performance index varies quite a lot. 
 
Of the 16 periods five of them are without best practice performers. The first period with 
prices  still increasing, has no best practice performer. Then in 1991:II when the prices 
                                                            




start to collapse, there is only one best practice performer, and then none in the following 
period, only one in the period after, and then none again in 1993:I. But then there are two 
best practice units in 1993:II when the prices flattens out, and one best practice performer 
in each of the two successive periods. After the collapse of the market the prices seems to 
keep up somewhat better in Europe than in US. Interestingly, in the last year 1995 there 
are no best practice performers, and the performance is rather weak in an inter-temporal 
frame of reference.  
 
4.2 The inter-temporal pattern of efficiency 
distributions we see that Christie’s London is the biggest house, followed by Sotheby’s 
New York, Sotheby’s London and Christie’s New York. The four big houses have over ¾ 
of total sales over the 16 periods. Only one house, “Rest of US” does not have a best-
performing unit. All the sales are quite small. This is also the case for “Germany”. The 
four other small houses except “Switzerland” that as a small best practice unit, all have 
some medium-sized best performers. A general impression is that the index defined by (4) 
shows the auction house performance against the total inter- temporal mean.  The 
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The distribution of the index, sorted from the smallest values to the highest for each 
auction house, is presented in Figure 1. Each bar represents a unit. The size of each unit, 
measured in total period sales, is proportional to the width of each bar. The inter-temporal 
index is measured on the vertical axis and the sales values in 1990 dollars accumulated on 
the horizontal axis. The maximal value above the mean is 2.54, meaning that the best 
practice performers have sales that are 154% above the sales it would have had if the 
performance had been average. Inspecting the auction house distributions we see that 
Christie’s London is the biggest house, followed by Sotheby’s New York, Sotheby’s 
London and Christie’s New York. The four big houses have over ¾ of total sales over the 
16 periods. Only one house, “Rest of US” does not have a best-performing unit. All the 
sales are quite small. This is also the case for “Germany”. The four other small houses 
except “Switzerland” that as a small best practice unit, all have some medium-sized best 
performers. A general impression is that the small units are under performing compared 
with the mean performance, while the large units are over performing. This is especially 
evident for Christie’s London, where the two largest sales are best performers, and also 
the same for Sotheby’s London. The exception is Sotheby’s New York, where a small unit 
is the only best practice performer. It is notable that the group of best practice performers, 
although dominated by medium- and the largest sized units, also comprises some small 
units. 
 
4.3 The inter-temporal performance 
The information  in Figure 1 can be used to create an overall ranking of auction houses by 
computing the auction house overall performance index defined in (5). The results are set 
out in Table 3.  We see that Christie’s London is the overall best performer, with 
somewhat surprisingly “Switzerland” and “World” following next. Sotheby’s New York 
and London come as No. 4 and 5, and then Christie’s New York. The worst performers 
are “Other US” last, and “France” and “Germany” following, all three performing 
markedly below the average.  
 
So far we have used performance information related to sales of all types of prints. To 





Table 3. The Overall Performance Index 
Auction House  Index value 
Sotheby’s New York   1.1240 
Sotheby’s London  1.1052 
Christie’s New York  1.0653 
Christie’s London  1.5212 
France  0.6876 
Switzerland  1.3066 
Germany  0.9101 
Other EU  1.0162 
Other US  0.4098 
World  1.2992 
 
periods, we developed an inter-temporal performance index (6) measuring the actual sales 
of each type of  print as compared to the potential sales the auction house could have had 
in each period if it has been as efficient as the best performer. This index is then specific 
for each type of print. We construct hypothetical sales values for under-performing units 
by employing the mark-up scores from the solution of program (2). For each type of print 
we can compare the sales performance over all the auction periods for each auction house 
by forming the ratio of actual sales values over calculated efficient sales values
17. The 
Overall Output- specific Performance Index,  PIma for the auction houses is set out in 
Table 4. Note that not only the performance mark-ups, but also the volume of sales count 
when constructing the performance indices. An auction house may have high performance 
mark-ups for a single period, as for Sotheby’s New York in 1994:II, Sotheby’s London in 
1991:I, Christie's New York 1993:II and Christie’s London in 1991:II (see Table 2), but 
this may not influence the performance index  much if the sales involved are small.  
 
We observe some striking differences in performance between auction houses for the 
different print techniques. Linocuts are  traded by all houses. Christie’s London has the 
highest performance with an index value of 0.86, followed by “World” and “Other EU”. 
The index value of 0.86 means that Christie’s London obtained  14% lower sales values 
than if it had been as good as best practice for all its period sales. The worst performers 
are quite below best practice, “Other US” has only 19 % of best practice sales, and 
“Germany” and “France” 26%.  
 
 
                                                            
17 Note that we compare a unit with best practice irrespective of period. A more conservative calculation 





Table 4. The Overall Output-specific performance Index 
Auction house  Etching  Litho  Drypoint  Aquatint  Linocut 
Sotheby’s New York   0.4657  0.5331  0.4507  0.5961  0.3866 
Sotheby’s London  0.3408  0.4749  0.8090  0.5576  0.4944 
Christie’s New York  0.3470  0.4664  0.6959  0.3793  0.3855 
Christie’s London  0.7641  0.7349  0.9026  0.8633  0.8577 
France  0.3110  0.2311  1  0.7708  0.2638 
Switzerland  0.3539  0.7832  -  0.4659  0.4563 
Germany  0.3418  0.3558  0.5969  0.4453  0.2631 
Other EU  0.5615  0.5512  -  0.7099  0.5190 
Other US  0.1764  0.1401  -  -  0.1930 
World  0.3251  0.8386  -  0.7243  0.7997 
 
 
Regarding aquatint “Other US” is not trading this technique. Christie's London is again 
the best performer with the index on the same level as for linocuts, with “France”  
following and then “World”. The lowest performers are not doing as badly as for linocuts, 
Christie’s New York under-performing by 38%, and “Germany” with 45%.  
 
The technique drypoint is the least sold. It is only traded by six of the houses. “France” 
has the maximal index value of 1 because at the two occasions where it sold drypoint 
prints  “France” became best practice. Christie’s London and Sotheby’s London come in 
the next places with relative high index values. The lowest performer Sotheby’s New 
York is 45% below best practice sales. 
 
All houses trade lithographs. The house “World” is doing best, under performing 16%, 
followed by “Switzerland” and Christie’s London under performing with 22% and 27% 
respectively.  The worst performer is “Other US”, under-performing substantially with 
86% , the highest percentage recorded for all time periods. 
 
For etchings Christie’s London is again the best performer, being 22% behind best 
practice, with “Other EU” and Sotheby’s New York coming next with quite higher under-
performances of 44% and 53% respectively. The worst performer is again “Other US”, 
being 82% behind best practice.  
 
Christie’s London has the most solid record overall, being in front for three techniques 




seen from Table 2 Christie’s London had especially strong performance in the pre-boom 
and boom years. It is also making the strongest recovery in the last two periods. “Other 
US” has the worst record, being last for the three techniques it has traded in. This is also 
in accordance with the ranking in Table 3. The high ranking of “World” and 
“Switzerland” according to the overall index (5) in Table 3 may be somewhat surprising.  
The inter-temporal print type-specific index (6) provide more detailed information. We 
have already commented that the high placing of “World” for linocuts and aquatints are 
based on having only two periods with sales, and being best practice in one of each 
periods. For lithographs the performance is more solid with six periods with trade, and 
having three best practice occurrences and two of them when sales volume were quite 
large.  “Switzerland has really only one strong line of prints performance, lithographs, 
where of the five trading periods one was best practice.  Based on disaggregation of the 
overall results provided by the inter-temporal performance index we suggest to downplay 
the ranking of “World” and “Switzerland” shown by the overall performance index. 
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
Although there is an increasing emphasis on performance of investment in prints, the role 
of auction houses has not been studied so much in the economic literature. It has been 
observed that similar prints can obtain quite different prices at different auctions within 
the same auction period, but no systematic exposition of differences have been offered.  
Previous works applying hedonic price technique have found no conclusive result about 
the most efficient auction house, but in these studies the object of art has been the unit, 
and influence of auction houses is analysed by testing whether auction house impact on 
price is significant or not within a framework of central tendencies.  
 
In order to focus on auction houses as units we have applied a benchmarking technique, 
DEA, developed for efficiency studies. The analogy of a  production process is a little 
special: the inputs are the physical characteristics, measured by surface area, of Picasso 
prints classified according to technique, and the outputs are the auction sales values within 




by type of technique and surface area of prints. However, these are variables found 
significant and used in studies of auction prices using hedonic regressions. 
   
We have developed a model with mixed categorical and continuous variables most 
suitable for art objects markets not used before in the efficiency literature. New light is 
shed on the issue of categorical variables in DEA models by interpreting them as different 
types of inputs and/or outputs. The inter-linkages between categorical variables turned out 
to be important for the empirical findings. 
 
A novel construct of the paper is various performance indexes giving an insight into 
auction house differences impossible to obtain using hedonic price regressions. The 
differences in auction prices for the same time pointed out in the literature (Pesando, 
1993) has been structured and measured by a Contemporaneous Performance index. There 
are indeed huge differences between auction houses. There is a tendency for differences 
being smallest around the boom price period, and varying quite a lot during the bust years 
of  the price boom. But also during the last years of the data set with stable average prices 
we see significant differences between auction houses.  
 
There is no dominant auction house being successful in all periods. We have calculated an 
index to exhibit overall performance specific to each type of print technique. Christie’s 
London comes out best. More surprisingly, Sotheby’s New York and London are not 
doing so well, about average for the 10 auction houses. “Other US” is performing the 
worst. One explanation is that the big auctions for Christie’s London are coming out as 
best practice, while this is not the case for Sotheby’s. Christie’s London was especially 
successful during the pre-boom and boom years. “Other US” is the worst performer, and 
has small volumes only. It is usually stated in the auction literature (Pesando, 1993) that 
large actions tend to increase the price. If this is the case it seems to be only Christie’s 
London that manages to benefit from this effect. 
 
What is the policy conclusion of the paper?  If you plan to sell your Picasso print you 




want to do a bargaining buying, you should go to the auction house with the lowest value 
of the performance index. 
 
The type of model developed may also be applied to other institutions or markets, where 
the unit in question use physical assets of various types to produce a financial result, e.g. 
financial market units like stock broker firms, pension funds, etc. 







In the efficiency literature the point of departure for sensitivity analysis is calculations of 
several indicators of signs of influential outliers. Their role as peers can be shown by 
calculating the relative increase in auction prices for each inefficient unit having the 
efficient unit in question as a peer or referencing unit on the frontier. In the case of output 
orientation, the peer index, rp
m, is calculated as the fraction of weighted total aggregated 
potential for increase in auction sales as function of the output type m (print technique) for 
which the peer, p, act as a referent (the unit index is j):
18 


































r                                                     (A.1)                                       
 
In  the numerator we have the weighted increase in output of type m of the inefficient 
units having unit  p as peer, normalised with the total sum of peer weights for each 
inefficient unit (the set P
j is the reference set of peers for unit j) in the case of CRS (for 
VRS the sum is 1) and in the denominator we have the total potential increase for output 
of type m if all inefficient units become efficient. The weights, ljp, are zero for inefficient 
units not having unit p as a peer. ( As a control, summing also over all the peers (index p) 
in the numerator, we get the index value of 1 for each type of output.) 
 
Another measure of the importance of peers is provided by calculating the super efficiency 
score (Andersen and Petersen, 1993). It is defined by removing the peer in question from 
the data set forming the frontier, and then calculating the score of the peer against this 
new frontier. The mark-up score must necessarily be smaller than (or equal to) one. A 
third measure of the importance is a pure count of the number of times a peer is a 
referencing unit for inefficient units. 
 
                                                            




Table A.1. The Peer Index; Super Efficiency; and Count 
Auction houses  Unit  Etching   Litho   Drypoint  Aquatint  Linocut  Super Eff.  Count 
Sotheby’s New York  112  0.0074  0.0226  0.0000  0.0012  0.0092  0.8187  20 
Sotheby’s London  204  0.0009  0.0018  0.0105  0.0006  0.0013  0.7632  3 
  205  0.0012  0.0007  0.0012  0.0025  0.0010  0.6258  8 
  210  0.0011  0.0021  0.0161  0.0016  0.0015  0.4522  4 
  214  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.6747  0 
Christie’ New York  302  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.9764  0 
  307  0.0004  0.0013  0.0120  0.0023  0.0026  0.1603  3 
  308  0.0000  0.0006  0.0000  0.0045  0.0000  0.9958  1 
Christie’s London  402  0.0017  0.0050  0.0003  0.0040  0.0013  0.7489  9 
  403  0.0096  0.0079  0.0166  0.0125  0.0164  0.7912  12 
  405  0.0010  0.0018  0.0145  0.0015  0.0034  0.4238  8 
  406  0.0054  0.0095  0.0111  0.0010  0.0167  0.7896  16 
France  503  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  *  0 
  504  0.0015  0.0023  0.0170  0.0042  0.0021  0.5318  4 
  512  0.1771  0.1763  0.3106  0.5279  0.1589  *  25 
Switzerland  513  0.0009  0.0007  0.0000  0.0044  0.0003  0.3635  4 
  604  0.0492  0.2274  0.0024  0.0585  0.0797  0.7299  37 
  605  0.6801  0.3753  0.3622  0.3074  0.4557  0.3198  68 
Germany  705  0.0123  0.0264  0.1544  0.0311  0.0256  0.1316  12 
  706  0.0004  0.0002  0.0000  0.0003  0.0000  0.8223  2 
  707  0.0014  0.0010  0.0000  0.0019  0.0065  0.9844  4 
Other EU  804  0.0237  0.0350  0.0569  0.0161  0.1511  0.7714  41 
World  1004  0.0190  0.0800  0.0141  0.0113  0.0450  0.4855  36 
  1005  0.0034  0.0062  0.0000  0.0002  0.0094  0.8516  10 
  1007  0.0023  0.0063  0.0003  0.0049  0.0026  0.7065  6 
•  No feasible solution  
 
Table A.1 sets out the peer index and also the super efficiency index and number of 
occurrences as referencing unit for a comparison. The indexing of the units by a three-
digit number has the number for the auction house and the period number as indicated in 
Table 2.  Table A.1 displays that three of the 25 efficient units (214, 302 and 503) are self-
evaluators, i.e. they are not peers for any inefficient unit. Removing these units will 
consequently have no impact on the efficiency scores of any inefficient unit, their Peer 
index values are zero. Of the 22 remaining peers a few stands out as most influential in 
terms of the peer index value. We have five units with an index value of more than 0.10, 
and only two units with values above that for all techniques.  
 
Inspecting the count number reveal that 15 units have below 10 efficient units in their 
referencing sets. The two with dominating peer index values have 68 and 25 respectively, 




Regarding etchings, the one dominating peer, unit 605, “Switzerland” for 1990:I, has an 
index value of 0.68, meaning that 2/3 of the total weighted potential improvement in 
auction values are due to the inefficient units having unit 605 as a peer. This is the 
maximal value for all types of prints. We see that the peer index values for the other 
techniques are almost half. This is due to the fact that unit 605 only trades in etchings. 
Nevertheless, unit 605 has the highest peer index value for also lithographs, drypoints and 
linocuts. The count index for unit 605 is the maximal, almost 50% higher than the  peer 
with the second highest count, unit 804.  This unit has the third highest peer index value 
for linocuts, but is ranked for the other print techniques. This is explained by the fact that 
unit 8 04 only trades in linocuts. For aquatints unit 512, “France” in 1993:II, has the 
highest peer index, considerably higher than unit 605. All other peer index values are 
quite low. The count index for unit 512 is not so high, ranking as No. 5. There seems in 
general to be a lack of discrimination using the count number as to type of technique. Unit 
512 only trades in aquatints.  There is a general pattern that units with high peer index 
values only trade in a single technique. 
 
The super efficiency index may  indicate the sensitivity of the local shape of the 
transformation surface by calculating the mark-up score for efficient units without 
including the unit in the set. We see from Table A.1 that only a few units stand out, unit 
307, 605, and 705, with values of 0.16, 0.32 and 0.13 respectively. The number 0.13 is 
interpreted as the share of the outputs that the benchmark for unit 705 has of the observed 
outputs of unit 705. Five more units have super-efficiency score less than 0.5. For two 
units the program failed to find feasible solutions. Unfortunately this concerns unit 512 
with a high peer index. There seems overall to be a poor correlation between the value of 
the super efficiency score and the importance of the peer in terms of a peer being a 
referent for many inefficient units. The super efficiency index seems to be of more value 
as a guide to a sensitivity check on the shape of the frontier itself. It measures how much 
outputs can be reduced and the unit still being on the frontier. 
 
Although we have exposed some dominating units, there are no clear “red lights” as to 
outliers unduly influencing the results. It should be born in mind that any benchmarking 




maximal changes in variables of key units in order to generate changes in the mark-up 


































Table A.2. Auction house statistics 
Auction house  Technique  No.Obs  Inputs (square centimetres) 
Mean     Std. Dev.    Min       Max 
Outputs (US dollars) 
Mean      Std. Dev.        Min          Max 
Sotheby's   etching  64  1573  3854  44  31520  5331  9223  884  75456 
New York  litho  74  2852  1255  416  9506  19407  21685  1054  127332 
 drypoint  12  1181  595  348  2200  3954  2159  2027  9615 
 aquatint  25  1313  942  51  3922  9985  16519  1738  83462 
 linocut  54  2929  989  364  3578  26594  28557  4181  130500 
                     
Sotheby's   etching  43  1272  588  146  2833  4097  2319  1296  13842 
London  litho  50  2977  843  540  4640  16953  23806  2027  161919 
 drypoint  6  2124  697  1451  3376  8470  6014  3670  19976 
 aquatint  21  1515  966  72  4112  14977  31476  2426  147114 
 linocut  49  3333  1175  968  4882  36581  45386  2830  242307 
                     
Christie's   etching  32  1151  730  92  3239  4584  4591  1178  23566 
New York  litho  32  2663  947  591  4330  14610  14262  3244  72661 
 drypoint  6  1061  318  707  1536  3425  2005  560  6467 
 aquatint  10  2138  1417  106  3927  8212  4547  2160  15886 
 linocut  37  3129  932  948  4631  29946  48547  3224  226368 
                     
Christie's   etching  27  994  709  107  2540  6435  5299  1697  20772 
London  litho  42  3166  940  1215  7576  29798  38798  2910  214231 
 drypoint  5  1955  1210  58  3927  17382  29000  3393  69228 
 aquatint  12  1955  1210  58  3927  20944  29662  2198  92839 
 linocut  42  2571  1154  367  3498  60382  73763  4741  311535 
                     
France  etching  21  1128  628  92  2489  4486  3779  920  18828 
 litho  14  2778  1040  1026  4243  5747  5680  1379  23130 
 drypoint  3  1000  189  782  1109  3490  343  3094  3688 
 aquatint  4  1563  1857  63  3944  29048  45022  1533  95791 
 linocut  8  2835  991  939  3673  14080  6846  4153  22109 
                     
Switzerland  etching  11  1237  773  241  2981  4889  1646  2901  7668 
 litho  14  2829  1242  496  4336  26518  27762  3270  89815 
 drypoint  0                 
 aquatint  3  2513  1335  1237  3901  14479  15630  3928  32436 
 linocut  5  2945  1448  973  4774  20805  8536  11976  30107 
                     
Germany  etching  10  1620  1157  301  3804  6702  3360  2600  13542 
 litho  37  2698  798  567  3947  11415  10371  1935  51084 
 drypoint  3  778  1131  122  2083  3050  396  2676  3465 
 aquatint  6  2500  1346  1298  4019  9457  6088  3002  18243 
 linocut  11  2874  1006  1002  3571  12895  7963  4820  30979 
                     
Other EU  etching  8  1522  673  451  2045  4651  2225  2660  8622 
 litho  17  2857  689  852  3857  24076  26448  5480  101799 
 drypoint  0                 
 aquatint  2  1513  301  1300  1726  10391  9298  3816  16965 
 linocut  12  3108  1101  945  4774  37241  44906  3973  160853 
                     
Other US  etching  10  1083  480  305  1804  2710  981  1216  4741 
 litho  10  2317  1150  539  3531  5529  2702  1589  10273 
 drypoint  0                 
 aquatint  0                 
 linocut  7  2284  1448  373  3495  8562  5496  3161  18000 
                     
World  etching  13  1049  358  482  1536  4400  4816  1320  19807 
 litho  9  3136  1009  727  4453  42361  33443  6164  108289 
 drypoint  0                 
 aquatint  3  905  445  578  1411  4585  1727  2641  5941 







Agnello, R. J., Pierce, R.K. (1999), Investment Returns and Risk for Art: Evidence from 
Auctions of American Paintings (1971-1996), Working Paper 99/03, University of 
Delaware. 
 
Andersen, P., Petersen, N.C. (1993), A procedure for ranking efficient units in Data 
Envelopment Analysis, Management Science 39, 1261-1264. 
 
Anderson, R. C.  (1974), Paintings as Investment, Economic Inquiry 12,13-26. 
 
 
Banker, R. D., Morey, R.C. (1986), The use of categorical variables in Data 
Envelopment Analysis, Management Science 32(12), 1613-1627. 
 
Buelens, N., Ginsurgh, V. (1993), Revisiting Baumol’s ‘art as floating crap game’, 
European Economic Review 37, 1351-1371. 
 
Candela, G., Scorcu, A.E. (1997), A Price Index for Art Market Auctions. An 
application to the Italian Market of Modern and Contemporary Oil Paintings, Journal of 
Cultural Economics 21(3), 175-196. 
 
Caves, D.W., Christensen, L.R., Diewert, E. (1982), The economic theory of index 
numbers and the measurement of input, output, and productivity,  Econometrica  50, 
1393-1414. 
 
Chanel, O., Gérard-Varet, L.A., Ginsurgh, V. (1996), The Relevance of Hedonic Price 
Indices, Journal of Cultural Economics 20, 1-24. 
 
Charnes, A., Cooper, W.W., Lewin, A.Y., Seiford, L.M. (eds.) (1994), Data 
Envelopment Analysis: Theory, Methodology, and Applications, Boston/Dordrecht/ 
London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, Section 3.3 Categorical inputs and outputs, 52-
54. 
 
Coelli, T., Rao, D.S.P., Battese, G.E. (1998),  An introduction to efficiency and 
productivity analysis, Boston/Dordrecht/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
 
Czujack, C. (1997), Picasso paintings at auction, 1963-1994,  Journal of Cultural 
Economics 21, 229-247. 
 
Farrell, M.J. (1957), The measurement of productive efficiency, Journal of the Royal 
Statistical Society, Series A, 120 (III), 253-281.  
 
Frey, B. S., Pommerehene, W.W. (1989),  Muses and Markets; Explorations in the 
Economics of the Arts, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
 
Førsund, F. R. (2002), Categorical variables in DEA, International Journal of Business 





Førsund, F.R., Zanola, R. (2002), Selling Picasso paintings: the efficiency of auction 
houses, Working Paper 7/01, International Centre for Economic Research (ICER). 
 
Kamakura, W.A. (1988), A note on the use of categorical variables in Data 
Envelopment Analysis, Management Science 34(10), 1273-1276. 
 
Locatelli-Biey, M., Zanola, R. (2002), The market for sculptures: an adjacent year 
regression index, Journal of Cultural Economics 1,  
 
Locatelli-Biey, M., Zanola, R. (2002), The Market for Paintings: An Hybrid Price 
Index, WP, University of Eastern Piedmont.  
 
Pesando, J.E. (1993), Art as an investment: The market for modern prints, American 
Economic Review 83, 1075-1089. 
 
Pesando, J.E., Shum, P.M. (1999), The returns to Picasso’s prints and to traditional 
financial assets, 1977 to 1996”, Journal of Cultural Economics 23, 183-192. 
 
Picci, L. and Scorcu, A.E. (2002): Bidders’ and sellers’ strategies in sequential auctions. 
New evidence about the afternoon effect, Economica (forthcoming). 
 
Renneboog, L., Van Houtte, T. (2002), The monetary appreciation of paintings: from 
realism to Magritte, Cambridge Journal of Economics 26, 331-357. 
 
Torgersen, A.M., Førsund, F.R., Kittelsen, S.A.C. (1996), Slack-adjusted efficiency 
measures and ranking of efficient units, Journal of Productivity Analysis 7(4), 379-398.  